Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Phillip C. Pepper, an Arizona resident, et al. v. Zions
First National Bank : Reply Brief of Third Party
Plaintiff-Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bernard L. Rose; Attorney for Defendant/Respondent, Fred M. Rosenthal;
Gary R. Rowe; Charles M. Bennett; Sheryl L. Simpson; Callister, Duncan & Nebeker; Attorneys for
Plaintiffs/Appellants, Zions First National Bank.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Pepper v. Zions First National Bank, No. 198620958.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1466

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

——$fa2&3£Z* * * * * * *

PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an

)

Arizona resident, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

)
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)
)
>
)
)
)
)
)
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and Appellants,
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FRED M. ROSENTHAL, et al.,
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Court should find that there remain in dispute genuine
issues of material fact regarding Fred M. Rosenthal's
("Rosenthal") liability for indemnification to Zions such that
the September 9, 1985 Order of Summary Judgment ought to be
either vacated or amended to show that its finality is
contingent upon the finality of the Zions Order dated July 5,
1985.

The responsive arguments raised by Rosenthal are

improperly raised in this appeal because Rosenthal did not
argue them to the Court below.

Although, his arguments were

raised in another proceeding on a motion to dismiss which has
not been appealed, that proceeding is unrelated to the instant
appeal.

Moreover, the arguments raised in the unrelated motion

to dismiss were unpersuasive at that time, and the motion was
consequentially denied.

ARGUMENT

ROSENTHAL'S RESPONSIVE ARGUMENTS ARE IMPROPERLY RAISED
IN THIS APPEAL IN THAT THEY WERE NOT CONSIDERED BY
THE TRIAL COURT IN THE CORRESPONDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PROCEEDING BELOW, AND WERE DENIED AS PREVAILING
ARGUMENTS IN A PRIOR MOTION TO DISMISS, WHICH DENIAL
IS NOW PRECEDENTIAL IN THIS APPEAL.
The issues presented in this appeal are whether there
remain in dispute genuine issues of material fact regarding

Rosenthal's culpability and whether the motion made below, if
found to have been properly granted, was properly consummated
in the order with regards to its finality and form.

The record

shows that it was entered with prejudice and not contingent
upon any other motion or proceeding; therefore, the Order
excludes its dismissal from being related to the Zions Order,
(See Exhibit A-7 attached to Appellant's Brief.)

A•

Rosenthal Improperly Raises New Issues in This Appeal.

It is difficult to understand the arguments raised by
Rosenthal in his Respondent's Brief.

Rather, Rosenthal's Brief

is conclusory in nature and fails to establish facts of law
which oppose those raised in Zions' Brief.

It appears as

though Rosenthal is arguing that Zions' claim regarding
Rosenthal's negligence is either improperly brought or easily
defended on the ground that any alleged damaging acts were
caused by Zions* independent intervening acts sufficiently
forceful to break any chain of causation involving Rosenthal.
Brief of Respondent at 5-11.

However, Rosenthal never raised

this issue in his motion for partial summary judgment below.
(See Rosenthal's Memorandum in Support of Rosenthal Motion For
Summary Judgment, a copy of which is attached hereto as Reply
Exhibit 1.)
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It is clear that for a question to be considered on appeal,
the record must reflect that such issue was presented to the
trial court in a timely manner sufficient to obtain a ruling
thereon.

Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659

P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).

Applying this principle to the

case at hand, it appears as though the issues regarding
Rosenthal's negligence, as compared to the claims made by
plaintiffs against Zions regarding Zions' intentional
misrepresentation and fraud, may not properly be raised for the
first time in this appeal.

B.

Denial of Rosenthal's Unrelated Motion to Dismiss is
Precedential in this Appeal.

For an even greater reason, the arguments now raised by
Rosenthal were previously raised in a motion to dismiss
unrelated to the instant appeal, but a part of this entire
civil matter.

On January 26, 1984 Rosenthal filed a Motion to

Dismiss Zions1 Third Party Complaint on the grounds that the
Third Party Complaint failed to state a claim against Rosenthal
upon which relief could be granted.

(See R. at 722-724, a copy

of which is attached hereto as Reply Exhibit-2.)

- 3 -

In his Memorandum submitted in support of the January 26,
1984 motion, Rosenthal set forth two questions raised therein:

1.
Can ZION's [sic] found its complaint in
negligence after Judge Hal Taylor's Order
approving ratifying the acts of and
discharging ZIONS as Personal Representative?
2.
Can the injury suffered by Plaintiff
from ZIONS alleged intentional
misrepresentations be proximately the result
of ROSENTHAL'S alleged negligence?

R. at 713-721.

(See Reply Exhibit-3 attached hereto.)

During oral arguments on the motion to dismiss, Rosenthal
argued that Zions' Third Party Complaint alleged negligence,
and that even if the negligence claim were not barred, it must
fail for lack of proximate cause.

R. at 8.

Rosenthal stated

that M[a]cts, if any, attributable to ROSENTHAL are instruments
of superior or controlling principal.

Certainly no

relationship exists between ROSENTHAL'S conduct and harm to
Plaintiff."

R. at 720.

After hearing arguments on the motion, Judge Sawaya signed
an Order dated April 9, 1984 which states:

- 4 -

The said Third Party Complaint, although
defensible, does state causes of action
which require response by the third party
defendants and accordingly, the motions to
dismiss are denied . . .

R. at 906-910.

(See Reply Exhibit-4 attached hereto.)

Rosenthal now argues in his Respondent's Brief that he was
entitled to summary judgment as a matter law for the reason
that Zions failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against him, based on the arguments raised in
his motion to dismiss.

(Brief of Respondent at 5-11.)

Inasmuch as the Court denied his January 26, 1984 motion, it is
the precedential law of the instant appeal that substantive
issues do remain on Zions1 claims against Rosenthal.
Consequently, the arguments raised by Zions in this appeal are
more persuasive in leading this Court to a correct resolution
in its favor.

CONCLUSION

Based on the record in this case and the argument presented
by Zions and Rosenthal, it is apparent that there remain in
dispute genuine issues of material fact regarding Rosenthal's

- 5 -

liability for indemnification to Zions for his responsibility
for the dissipation of the Pepper estate assets.

As a result,

Zions respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
September 9, 1985 Order of summary judgment entered by the
district court.

That order can be either vacated or amended to

provide that its finality is contingent upon the finality of
the Zions Order.

In either manner, Zions' claim for

indemnification against Rosenthal is preserved in the event the
Zions Order is reversed on appeal.

Respectfully Submitted,

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
GARY R. HOWE
CHARLES M. BENNETT
SHERYL L. SIMPSON

By > W W ^
SherylQ^. Simpson
Attorneys for Third-Party
Plaintiffs-Appellant, Zions
First National Bank
CDN2799S
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify by the undersigned that four (4) copies of
the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK were mailed, postage fully prepaid
this

( I"' day of July, 1986, to the following:

BERNARD L. ROSE
Attorney for Respondent
Fred M. Rosenthal
32 Exchange Place, Suite 404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Edward S. Sweeney
J. Peter Mulhern
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER

^Mm^frwu
Sheryl U.) Simpson
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ADDENDUM
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REPLY EXHIBIT-1

MM 11 4 5*PH'85
g LERK

BERNARD L. ROSE
Attorney for Third P\rty Defendant,
32 Exchange Place, Siiite.- 404
Salt Lake City, Utah m i l l
Telephone: (801) 355-^888

\

Ts^rrthal .. ~CtzIuC

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona

resident; PI- \\ . ,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF ROSENTHAL MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
N.A.; et al.,

C i v i l No.

C-82-2779

Defendant and
Counterclaimant.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
N A. ; et al.,
Third-Party

JAMES F. SAWAYA, JUDGE

Plaintiffs,

FRED M. ROSENTHAL, an A r i z o n a
r e s i d e n t ; et a l ,
Third-Party

Defendants.

Zions and Rosenthal entered into a Stipulation dated 22
April

I »H4

whoi -'in it w.v.. stated "Zion1^ complaint does

not and shall not be construed as alleging any claim against

-9-

Plaintiffs1 Complaint, and renounces liability in Rosenthal
for punitive damages relating to the said third and fourth."
Since Plaintiff's First Cause is "umbrella" and fifth
cause contingent, emphasis is placed on such relief as the
court may grant relative to the Plaintiffs1 second cause of
action.
FACTS
1.

Zions Third Party Complaint, paragraphs 14, 17, and

23, alleges Third Party Defendants, including Rosenthal,
were involved as management personnel or accountant of
Allied Steel Company, Peppers Allied Metals Co., Peppers
Allied Steel Company, and Learner Pepper Company.

Paragraph

17, " . . . in the course of responsibilities of employment
they

(including Rosenthal) made representations of material

fact. . . . "
2.

Paragraphs 22 and 23 allege Third Party Defendant

responsibility, including Rosenthal, to be due to failure to
exercise reasonable care, in failure to discover or disclose
facts.
3.

Paragraph 25 alleges it was reasonably foreseeable

Third Party Defendants would exercise reasonable care in the
performance of their duties.
4.

Rosenthal alleges his employment with Pamco ceased

on or about December 23, 1980, and Zions agrees. (Response
to Rosenthal Interrogatory #1.)
-10-

5.

In r e s p o n s e t o I n t e r r o g a t o r y

4, r e q u e s t i n g

factual

s p e c i f i c s of R o s e n t ha ] ! 5 pa 1:t L c i p a t i on in t h e a c t i v i t i e s
Pamco a f t e r

December 2 3 , 1 9 8 0 , and s t a t e m e n t of

which Z i o n ' s s e e k s r e c o v e r y of
his acts

relating

damaqes

i s not aware o f

i n wh i nl: 1 R o s e n t h ;

•

December 2 3 , 19 8 0 .

However, Zio

had c o n t i n u i n g
officers,
6.

facts

for

from R o s e n t h a l ,

for

t o Pamco a f t e r November 30,

r e s p o n s e was " Z i o n ' s

olvpfi nn

*

1980,

official

believes

that

that

-:aon:

L I, * \ 11 a t t e m p t t o r e c o v e r from R o s e n t h a l

fact.™

'"Zions h a s n o t y e t c o m p l e t e d di 51 o v ^ r y

Plaintift

and t h e r e f o r e

Rosenthal

f o r h i s a c t s or

assets

Response
of

cannot s t a t e

claims

1; inder t h e c o n t r o l

against

1 1 > I n t e r r o g a t .ory #5 " . . . - - -

the r e s p e c t i v e

of

Irmii

omissions."

trusts,

Zions b e l i e v e s

d i d n o t have any i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h a s s e t s

9.

Plaintiffs,

j ro tin de d 1 ip :> r 1 ac t i o n s of Ro s en 11 1 a 1 i mput ed to

Z i o n s i n law or i n

8.

Rosenthal

date,"

such r e c o v e r y which a r e r e c o v e r e d from Zions by

7

activities

*»na_: of Pamco a f t e r •

As t o damages a g a i n s t R o s e n t h a l ,

wh i ch a r e

Zions

in:

and e m p l o y e e s a f t e r

g e n e r a 11 y" h t,11H

of

the trust

,.

^ respect
Rosenthal

which wen*

solely

However,

!,

"

I c a n n o t f i n d i n t h e r e m a i n d e r of f o r t y p a g e s

I n t e r r o g a t or i e s

arm I r e s p o n s e s , any words

r e s p o n s i v e which r e s o l v e

t h e q u e s t i o n s of
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forthrightly
Rosenthal's

of

to

implication in the allegations of the Plaintiffs1 second
cause of action,
10.

I ask the court as a matter of law, to give

judgment on, or limine relief on, or strike on behalf of
Rosenthal, such issues of fact which are irrelevant to Fred
Rosenthal as measured by his negligence, particularly if
negligence is the measure of Rosenthal's culpability.
ARGUMENT
Principal Plaintiffs1 second cause starts with
paragraph 70 of Complaint.
Paragraphs 70 through 74 create no culpability in
Rosenthal occurring after December 1980.
Paragraph 75 alleges Zions represented to Plaintiffs
that the sale of the interest in Lerner Pepper was to
benefit beneficiaries, when in fact it was to protect Zion's
line of credit in sum of $930,000.
Paragraphs 76 through 81 all relate to the sale of
these assets and the distribution of the major portion of
the receipts to Zions.
Paragraph 82 alleges distribution of approximately
$220,000 to Kennecott to pay a debt of an insolvent
corporation (Pamco).

There is no allegation either here or

in the third party complaint, that these acts so far
complained of were prior to Rosenthal's leaving Pamco in
-12-

December 1980, or that he was In a decision making role in
"Tt>;ji i:,i.:t, i, ,\

the execution of these acts

the preceding

related incidents occurred after December 31, 1980.
Paragraph 84 is an umbrella paragraph of alphabetical
denoni na t io n f r c>m

(.3 I tfi i: ouqh I k ) only one of which of

Rosenthal's involvement may be an issue; i.e. subparagraph
(k).
WHEREFORE, Third Party Defendant, Fred Rosenthal, prays
for judgment on, or limine relief on, or strike nn behalf
of Rosenthal, such issues of fact which are irrelevant to
Fred Rosenthal as measured by his negligence, particularly
if negligence is the measure of Rosenthal s culpability.
DATED this

/ 3 day Qt-JJay, 1985.
^

>

BERNARD L. ROSE
Attorney for Rosenthal

-13-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the / ? ^ day of May, 1985, I
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Memorandum in Support of Rosenthal Motion for Summary
Judgment, postage prepaid, to:
H. Michael Keller, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
P.O. Box 3400
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
H. Russell Hettinger, Esq.
GREEN, CALLISTER & NEBEKER
Suite 800, Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Edward S. Sweeney, Esq.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John S. ChLndlund, Esq.
PRINCE,

YEATES & GLEDZARLER

425 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Richard D. Parry, Esq.
Ross C. Anderson, Esq.
BERMAN & ANDERSON
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 178
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Donald C. Hughes, Esq.
2411 Keisel'::^e4iue, No. 104

Ogden, Utah -&£§£

FU £0 HI CLERKS OFFICE
SALTUVS T W P M I T A H

REPLY EXHIBIT-2

FEB I » w M W

BERNARD L. ROSE
Attorney for Defendant,
Fred M. Rosenthal
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111
Telephone: (801) 532-2666

H. 0IX0N HINDtEY GlERK
3*D MST. CC'JRT
OE.'VT.'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona
resident; et. al.,

)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
N.A., et. al.,

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant and
Counterclaimant.
* * * • *

A

*

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
N.A ,
Third-Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STUART A. PEPPER, a Nevada
resident; WILLIAM RONALD
PEPPER, a Wyoming resident;
FRED M. ROSENTHAL, an Arizona
resident; CHARLES H. FOOT, a
Utah resident; and FRANK C.
NIELSEN, J.,WILL LEWIS, RAY
0. WESTERGARD, ROGER BROWN
and PHILLIP E. OSBORNE d/b/a
FOX & COMPANY, and MAIN
HURDMAN, a Utah Corporation,
Third Party
Defendants.
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Civil No. C82-2779

COMES NOW Defendant, FRED tU ROSENTHAL, for himself, by his
attorney, BERNARD L. ROSE, and moves this Court pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss Third Party
Plaintiff's Complaint herein on file on the ground that said Third
Party Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim against Third
Party Defendant upon which relief can be granted, and for
attorney's fees in the sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($3,500.00) .
This Motion is based on Third Party Plaintiff's Complaint
and Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Rosenthal's Affidavit
and Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of
Motion to Dismiss.

-^__
eta,
DATED this ^ £ ; day of January, 1984.
^

^-^_~^SS^.
Bernard L. Rose
Attorney for Defendant,
Fred M. Rosenthal
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum
Supporting Fred Rosenthal's Motion to Dismiss Zions' Third Party
Complaint to:
H. Russell Hettinger
Greene, Callister & Nebeker
Suite 800, Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

Mike Keller
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwa.ll & McCarthy
P.O. Box 3400
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
Donald C. Hughes, Jr.
2411 Keiel Avenue, #104
Ogden, Utah 84401
Edward S. Sweeney
Biele, Haslam & Hatch
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John S. Chindlund
Prince, Yeates & Geld2ahler
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Main Hurdman
Suite #460, Kennecott Buildina
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
this ^(c^

day of January, 1984.
//

MVUM^r
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REPLY EXHIBIT-3

FH ED III CIEP<S OFFICE
SALT LA* SCCUM PMJTArf

fa! fflwIHW

BERNARD L. ROSE
Attorney for Defendant,
Fred M. Rosenthal
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Teleohone: (801) 532-2666

H. OIXOH HIHCLEY CLERf
DC-IT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona
resident; et. al.,

)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
tf.A., et. al. ,
Defendant and
Counterclaimant.

MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
FRED ROSENTHAL'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
ZIONS' THIRD AMENDED
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

*******

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
S.A., et. al.,

Civil No. C82-2779

Third-Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STUART A. PEPPER, a Nevada
resident; WILLIAM RONALD
PEPPER, a Wyoming resident;
FRED M. ROSENTHAL, an Arizona
resident; CHARLES H. FOOT, a
Jtah resident; and FRANK C.
NIELSEN, J. WILL LEWIS, RAY
D. WESTERGARD, ROGER BROWN
and PHILLIP E. OSBORNE d/b/a
FOX & COMPANY, and MAIN
iURDMAN, a Utah Corporation,
Third Party
Defendants.
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STATEMENT. OF FACTS
1.

About February 17, 1976 on ZIONS Petitions, JUDGE JA24ES

SAWAYA Ordered:
(a)

ZIONS appointment as Executor of the Estate of

JEROME B. PEPPER, who died January 9, 1976,
(fa)

Continuance ot operation of specific steel

operations, and
(c)

"authorized H I P appointment

by ZIONS nf FRED M.

ROSENTHAL to represent ZIONS as Executor in the operation" of each as General Manager (Probate Fi le #62736).
AUiui" April ly, I"i76r ZIONS acquired to itself all*
contingent interests and rights to the income and equities of the
PEPPER Estate and Trusts by various

.ucutrily instruments; and

thereafter, as Trustee of PEPPER INTERVIVOS TRUSTS guaranteed an
$800,000.00 line of credit by ZIONS BANK to PASCO and PAMCO
(2) on the metals operations.

two

Thereafter, ZIONS through PAMCO,

nade loans which were expended by ZIONS for purposes ultra vires of
PAMCO, not for PAMCO ' s 1 eg 11imate pur; •' njses I Paragraphs 23-39 ,
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint).
December 23, 1980, ROSENTHAL severed connection with
ZION- :•

:.?! ^

Interest s (Unrefuted Affidavit filed with prior

Motion to Dismiss).
4.

On October 8 f 1981, .JUDGE HAL TM'LOR Ordered:
(a)

Approval of First and Final Account;

(b)

Ratified and approved all arts of ZTONS as Personal

Representative of the Estate of JEROME B. PEPPER including distribution to itself, on May 28th, 1981 as Trustee,of
the PEPPER interest in the LEARNER-PEPPER co-venture,
which Trustee sold on May 28th, 1981 for $1,000,000.00
(Paragraphs 43, 47, 48 Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint) .
5.

FANNIE N. PEPPER received directly or out of probate,

less than $70,000.00 from all asset entities, whereas, (Paragraph
39) ZIONS, on March 31, 1981, as Personal Representative represented the net worths of PAMCO, LEARNER-PEPPER, the Estates of JEROME
3. PEPPER and FANNIE N. PEPPER to be in the periods between
December 31, 1979 and July 31, 1980 to be $597,653.00; $3,544,297.00
and $2,555,248.00.
6.

As to First Cause of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended

Complaint (Paragraph 56), on information and belief, accountants
and ROSENTHAL knew, and reported the true value of PEPPER ESTATE
assets to ZIONS, which continued to represent to Plaintiffs estate
values which ZIONS knew to be untrue.

Loss resulted from this

intentional misrepresentation made with intent, that Plaintiffs
rely thereon, and Plaintiffs did to their injury (Paragraph 58).
ZIONS charged trustees fees and professional fees in the
operation and liquidation of PAMCO, based on false values it
represented to Plaintiff (Paragraph 56).
7.

As to Second Cause of Action, ZIONS, as Personal Repre-

sentative, transferred the PEPPER interest in LEARNER-PEPPER to
itself as Trustee and as such, sold this interest with a true

purpose to protect ZIONS by paying its improvidently incurred
line of credit of approximately $930,000.00.

The date of transfer

and sale (Paragraph 43) was on or about May 28, 1981.

ROSENTHAL

on December 23, 1980 severed all connections with the Estate.
8.

As to Third Cause of Action, ZIONS as Trustee of FANNIE

N. PEPPER INTERVIVOS TRUST, breached its fiduciary relationship
as it relates to its purchase municipal bonds and excessive
charges of fees for funds flowing from foreign sources through
the said Trust.
9.

The Fourth Cause of Action alleges that as Trustee,

ZIONS failed its fiduciary relationship with the JEROME B. PfiPPER
IRREVOCABLE TRUST by not keeping trust corpus derived from
insurance policies separate from estate assets and used money for
purposes not intended by PEPPER.
10.

The Fifth Cause of Action recounts the sins of ZIONS

for the purpose of claiming punitive damages.
11.

ZIONS THIRD AMENDED THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT alleges on

information and belief, the Third Party Defendants in their
capacities as employees, agents, shareholders, directors, officers
of ALLIED STEEL COMPANY, PEPPERS ALLIED METALS, PEPPERS ALLIED
STEEL, and LEARNER-PEPPER were negligent in their duties and responsibilities for said companies and breached their contracts by
failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of their
duties, failed to discover and/or disclose facts with regard to
the financial condition of the comoanies.

12.

Paragraph 10

states ZIONS is Defendant who may be

lamaged to extent of recovery by Plaintiffs and on information
ind belief, ZIONS is entitled to recover against all Third Party
defendants to the extent of judgment on the ground that the
legligence and breaches of contract were the proximate cause of
± e damage which original Plaintiffs may have suffered.
ARGUMENT
Two (2) major questions are raised by ZIONS Complaint against
IOSENTHAL:
1 • Can ZION's found its complaint in negligence after Judge
lal Taylor's Order approving, ratifying the acts of, and discharg.ng ZIONS as Personal Representative?
2.

Can the injury suffered by Plaintiff from ZIONS alleged

.ntentional misrepresentations be proximately the result of
IOSENTHAL's alleged negligence?
ZIONS received from Judge David Dee the Answer to the First
juestion when he sustained ZION'S objection to Plaintiffs1
)riginal Complaint founded in negligence.

Judge Dee found negli-

gence is precluded as a vehicle for collateral attack on a decree
ipproving, ratifying and discharging.
In argument therein, was cited Auerbach vs. Samuels 10 (2)
.52; 349 P(2) 1112, as follows:
The difficulty confronting plaintiffs is the binding
effect with which such orders and decrees are endowed.
At this late date, they could pierce the protective
armor of the decree referred to above and successfully
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assert an interest in the estate only by showing
that they have been victims of fraud; and this
would have to be a kind known as extrinsic
fraud.
Extrinsic fraud is to be distinguished from
ordinary garden variety fraud. The latter...
is that which occurs in the framework of the
actual conduct of the trial .... The responsibility rests upon those conducting the
trial to expose and deal with any such
deception....
On the other hand,extrinsic fraud, with which
we are here concerned, is of a different character. It is sometimes referred to as collateral
fraud because it is the type of fraud which
would justify setting aside a decree or judgment on collateral attack. The characteristic
peculiar to extrinsic fraud is that it relates
... to happenings outside the actual trial...
so there is thus prevented any real contested
issues which would have been presented and
tried expect for the fraud. Accord In Re;
Raleigh Estate, supra, Moyes v. Agree,
supra, In Re; Rices1 Estate, supra.
As to the second question, assuming proximate cause is
determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent (Pease vs. Sinclair
Refining 104 F(2) 183; 123 ALR 933), it follows that the Court
must find, as a matter of law, ROSENTHAL to be the agent of
Personal Representative ZIONS, which hired ROSENTHAL as its
representative and which as early as within three (3) months of
the death of JEROME PEPPER was fully aware of the affairs of the
companies, having guaranteed as Trustee an increase in credit to
the iron companies.
Second, parameters of ROSENTHAL'S employment must be kept in
mind.
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a.

Scope of Authority,

He had none beyond the orbit

of the metals companies*
b.

Limit of Authority,

He represented the Executor as

General Manager of business operations.

He was subordin-

ate in authority in terms of operating statements,
balance sheets and audits and policy,
c.

ROSENTHAL had neither authority nor duty to the

trusts or trustee and no responsibility to either.
d.

ROSENTHAL had no responsibility to anything PEPPER

after December 23, 1980, his date of termination.
(Unrefuted Affidavit filed with previous Motion to
Dismiss.>
e. . According to PlaintiffsfComplaint, ROSENTHAL told
the truth, while ZIONS did not.
f.

ROSENTHAL did not participate in (1) escalating credit

to $930,000.00 in February, 1981 or (2) transferring
LEARNER-PEPPER and OGDEN YARD assets to ZIONS as Trustee,
or in their sale for One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00)
and Eighty Eight Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Two Dollars
($88,352.00) respectively, on or about May 28, 1981 and
use this trust cash to pay bankrupt corporate debts of
$249,000.00 with the remainder to itself as a bank to
reduce the credit line.
His authority was limited to his agency subject to the
supervision and audit of his principal, ZIONS, and Co-Third

M?1
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Party Defendants, the accountants.
ZIONS on or about September 23, 1981, filed for and received
from JUDGE HAL TAYLOR approval of First and Final Account, Final
Settlement, Ratification and Approval of Acts,
The Third Party Complaint alleges essentially only negligence.

Assuming such an action is not barred as against ROSENTHAL

by Decision in Samuels vs. Auerbajch, 10 Utah (2) 152; 349 P(2)
1112, then this action against ROSENTHAL must fail for lack of
proximate cause.

Acts, if any, attributable to

ROSENTHAL are

instruments of a superior or controlling principal.

Certainly no

relationship exists between ROSENTHAL'S conduct and harm to
Plaintiff.
Nor,_ if ROSENTHAL is negligent in any respect, can the Court
fail, as a matter law, first to ignore the contributory negligence
of ZIONS or its hired agents other than ROSENTHAL in failing to
discover ROSENTHAL errors, or second, the injurious acts inflicted
on Plaintiffs (PEPPER) by ZIONS as a Trustee intervening between
ROSENTHAL'S acts and PLAINTIFF'S injury.
It is incongruous that ZIONS having plucked plenteous fruits
from the orchards of an unwitting owner, who now demands their
return, should not be estopped from requiring apples as recoupment
from a subordinate, controlled agent who never even got near the
tree.
ZION's action against ROSENTHAL obscures the fact situation
that the other Third Party Defendants were more broadly involved
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with ZIONS than ROSENTHAL, not only in the time frame of activity
but also by involvement with the trusts as accountants and beneficiaries.
ZIONS action against FRED ROSENTHAL is without merit, not in
good faith, calculated to harass him by serving him as a party and
thereby subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, rather than as
a witness whose nonresidence creates the hazard of appearance as
well as the issue of his being a friendly or hostile witness.
ROSENTHAL is thereby entitled to reasonable attorneys fees
and a reasonable sum of such is Three Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($3,500.00) pursuant to Section 78-27-56 UCA (1973). •
WHEREFORE, ROSENTHAL moves this Court that it dismiss the
Complaint of ZIONS and this cause against FRED ROSENTHAL with
prejudice, and
2.

Award to him for the use and benefit of his attorney the

sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($3,500,00) .
DATED this— o Hay of January, 1984.

Attorney for Third P^rt^M&e#«iaant,
Fred Rosenthal
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REPLY EXHIBIT-4

3REENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER
J. THOMAS GREENE
4ARK O. VAN WAGONER
i. RUSSELL HETTINGER
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
3alt Lake City, Utah 84133
relephone: (801) 531-7676
attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

>H1LL1P C. PEPPER, an Arizona
resident; et a l . ,
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS
OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS
FRED M. ROSENTHAL, CHARLES
H. FOOTE, FOX & COMPANY
AND MAIN-HURDMAN TO DISMISS
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs,

510NS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
4.A. ; et al. ,
Defendants.

Civil No. C82-2779
*

*

*

*

*

5 IONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
J.A. ; et al. ,
Third-Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STEWART A. PEPPER, a Nevada
resident; et' a l . ,
Third-Party
Defendants.
* * * * * * *

On February 28, 1984, the following motions came on
regularly for hearing before the Court, the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, District Court Judge, presiding:

1.

Motion to Dismiss, dated January 26, 1984 (on behalf

on Fred M. Rosenthal);

2.

Motion of Third Party Defendants Charles H. Foote and

Fox h» Company to Dismiss Third Amended Third Party Complaint,
dated February 16, 1984;

3.

Motion of Charles E. Johnson to Dismiss the Third

Party Complaint for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief
Can be Granted and for Failure to Join Indispensible Parties,
dated February 16, 1984 (filed on behalf of Charles E. Johnson
dba riain-Hurdman) .

The movant third party defendants entered appearances as
follows:

Bernard L. Rose appeared on behalf of Fred M.

Rosenthal; Ross C. Anderson and Richard D. Parry appeared on
behalf of Main-Hurdman; and H. Michael Keller appeared on
behalf of Charles H. Foote and Fox & Company.

J. Thomas Groone

and H. Russell Hettinger appeared on behalf of third party
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plaintiff Zions First National Bank.

The Court having heard

the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the supporting
memoranda filed by all parties, and having taken the matter
under advisement to consider the arguments of counsel and the
written memoranda, and good cause appearing, it is hereby

ORDKKED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Third Party
Complaint dated December 16, 1984, although defensible, does
state causes of action which require response by the third
party defendants and accordingly, the third party defendants;
motions to dismiss are denied and third party defendants are
granted 15 days from March 23, 1984 in which to file an answer
to said Third Party Complaint.

DATED:

April
ril

//

», 1984.

BY THE COURT

l o r a b l e James S. Sawaya
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
GCN1118H

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
Clark

}6puty Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTIONS OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS FRED
M. ROSENTHAL, CHARLES H. FOOTE, FOX & COMPANY AND MAIN-HURDMAN
TO DISMISS THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT was hand delivered, this 30th
day of March, 1984, to the following:

Leonard J. Lewis
H. Michael Keller
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Charles H. Foote and fox & Company
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah
84110-3400
Irving H. Biele
Roy G. Haslam
Edward S. Sweeney
BIELE. HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Bernard L. Rose
Attorney for Fred M. Rosenthal
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
John S. Chindlund
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorneys for Stewart Pepper
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

-30-

Ross C. Anderson
Richard D. Parry
BERMAN & ANDERSON
P.O. BOX 1781
50 South Main Street
Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Donald C. Hughes, Jr. (mailed, postage prepaid)
Attorney for William Ronald Pepper
2411 Kiesel Avenue #104
Ogden, Utah
84401
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